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Institutional Shortfalls and a
Political Crisis
Anne Cussac
1 Only a few days after he announced the controversial results of the 2007 presidential
election,  Samuel  Kivuitu,  chairman  of  the  Electoral  Commission  of  Kenyan  (ECK),
acknowledged making the declaration under joint pressure from Mwai Kibaki’s Party of
National  Unity  (PNU)  and  Kalonzo  Musyoka’s  Orange  Democratic  Movement-Kenya
(ODM-K) and said on 1 January 2008: “I don’t know whether Kibaki won the election.”1 Because
of its suspected involvement in rigging, the ECK therefore appeared to be among the main
culprits in the political crisis.
2 After the opening of  the democratic space and the reintroduction of  the multi-party
system, a number of reforms had been made to enhance independence and capacity of
the  electoral  commission.  But  these  structures  were  merely  based  a  gentleman’s
agreement, and were not entrenched in the law, the only way of ensuring strong legal
backing. Similarly, there exists a whole legislative framework designed to guarantee free
and  fair  elections  and  to  deal  with  possible  petitions  that  may  arise  after  the
announcement of election results. However, the rules of the game and the weakness of
institutions charged with implementing these measures proved to be a limiting factor in
the ECK’s effectiveness. Evidence also revealed practices aimed at making the ruling party
all-powerful and, apart from the political crisis and of the violent clashes that ensued, the
controversial  2007  December  elections  not  only  uncovered a  number  of  institutional
shortcomings,  within not  only  the  electoral  commission,  but  also  within the  judicial
system and the Kenyan political system at large.
 
Electoral commission at the centre of controversy
3 Although the ECK had always been accused of not carrying out its duty with impartiality,
its good performance was recognized for the first time during the 2002 polls which was
marked by a smooth political transition. Nevertheless, during the entire 2007 campaign
period,  one of  the big  questions was the Commission’s  ability  to  guarantee free and
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transparent elections. While we agree that it satisfactorily presided over campaigns and
the voting exercise, the manner in which S. Kivuitu declared M. Kibaki’s re-election as
president  cast  doubt  on  the  commission’s  credibility  and  the  commissioners’
independence from the government.
 
Questions over the unilateral appointment of electoral
commissioners
4 The existence of the ECK is in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution,
which stipulate  that  its  responsibility  shall  be  to  organize  and oversee  the  electoral
process.2 In theory, with regard to Article 42(a) of the Constitution stipulates that its
functions,  which include:  “(a)  registration  of  voters  and maintenance  and updating  of  the
voters’  roll;  (b)  manage  and  supervise  independence,  the  institution  must  not  be  under  the
authority of any other organ.”3 Commissioners are appointed by the President for five years
and its Chair and Vice-Chair must be qualified to be judges of the High Court. Evidence
shows that until  in the 1990s,  the jurisdiction of ECK commissioners was confined to
defining borders of electoral constituencies, while the other organizational roles were the
responsibility of the provincial administration and the Supervisor of Elections. However,
as the 1992 general elections approached, the Election Laws Amendment Act No. 1 was
passed and this position was abolished and all powers of the Commission were restored.
Justice Richard Chesoni was appointed Chairman of the ECK, which then consisted of 11
commissioners, all appointed by Daniel arap Moi.4 He officially announced the general
elections date later that year, a prerogative that had hitherto been the President’s.5 In
spite of these apparent reforms, the whole of the 1992 election campaign period was
marked  by  opposition  concerns  over  the  institution’s  lack  of  independence.  Oginga
Odinga, M. Kibaki, Johnstone Makau and David Mukaru-Ng’ang’a initiated a petition to
press for the removal of R. Chesoni, who was considered to be President Moi’s man.6 Their
fears were confirmed during the campaigns and the voting process: the ECK appeared to
be in favour of KANU and could neither guarantee free and fair elections nor prevent
rigging.
5 A few years later, as the 1997 elections approached, the Inter Parliamentary Parties Group
(IPPG) negotiations led to the adoption of a body of reforms that would guarantee a more
democratic government and establish a freer and more level political playing field. This
was followed by the repealing of a number of laws restricting civil liberties (the freedom
of assembly and the freedom of association or expression) and an agreement increased
the number of ECK commissioners to 22.7 Justice R. Chesoni, whose integrity had been
questioned on several occasions and who had been replaced by S. Kivuitu as Commission
chairman,  was  appointed  Chief  Justice.  This  spoke  volumes  of  the  government’s
willingness to reform the judiciary.8 Furthermore, the IPPG agreement stipulated that
half of the ECK commissioners would be nominated by the opposition, even though they
would still be appointed by the President.9 M. Kibaki played an important role then in
putting pressure on D. arap Moi.  His party, the Democratic Party (DP),  also proposed
names of three commissioners among the ten new faces nominated by the opposition.10
Thus, the composition of the ECK ahead of the 2002 elections was no reason for major
concern. D. arap Moi made seven new appointments to replace commissioners whose
term had expired and renewed the terms of the rest of the commissioners, particularly
the ten who had been nominated by the opposition in 1997. Similarly, the Commission
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Chairman and the Vice-Chairman were retained in their positions. However, the integrity
of some of the commissioners remained in doubt, especially after a delegation led by S.
Kivuitu paid a courtesy visit to State House in February 2002 to meet President Moi. Since
the group only comprised commissioners appointed by KANU, other ECK commissioners
as  well  as  members  of  the  opposition  saw  it  as  a  political  visit  ahead  of  elections.
However, the doubts faded away after M. Kibaki’s victory.
6 In 2007, the term of office of 22 ECK commissioners expired before the election date and
one of the issues that arose was whether M. Kibaki would renew their terms to ensure
preparations for elections and the voting exercise were handled by experienced people.
Many of  those  who had assumed new commissioners  would  be  appointed  expressed
concern  over  whether  the  IPPG  arrangements  would  be  respected.  However,  on  12 
January, despite mounting pressure from members of the Orange Democratic Movement
(ODM) for the letter and spirit of the agreement to be respected, Mwai Kibaki drew battle
lines by unilaterally replacing commissioners with new appointees.11 In October, with less
than two months to the elections,  the terms of more commissioners expired, and M.
Kibaki  replaced  Gabriel  Mukele  as  ECK  Vice-Chairman  on  the  12th.12 Still  without
consulting at all with the opposition, he went further to appoint five new commissioners
on the 27th, and renewed the terms of two others.13 The only concession he made was to
re-appoint S. Kivuitu chairman of the Commission on 2 December.14 Indeed, the ODM led
by R. Odinga had intensified pressure, saying that free and fair elections would only be
guaranteed  by  retaining  S.  Kivuitu  as  the  ECK  chairman.  The  majority  of  the
commissioners were by all standards inexperienced, since only three of them (S. Kivuitu,
K. Muttu and J. Tumwa) had presided over an election before.
7 Of particular concern was that whereas the commissioners appointed to preside over the
2007 election had all been appointed or reappointed by President Kibaki, the Commission
could be suspected of working in his favour. Some of the appointments, considered as
partisan, raised questions about the independence of several commissioners from the
executive. For instance, K. Muttu was a former lawyer of the Kibaki family,15 while Muturi
Kigano had been M. Kibaki’s personal lawyer at one time and Pamela Mwikali Tutui was
married to a PNU candidate for the Kajiado Central parliamentary seat. The renewal of K.
Muttu’s contract and his elevation to Vice-chairman’s position at a time when G. Mukele
was being retired raised doubts over the criteria followed in renewing or not renewing
some commissioners’ terms of office. The letter and spirit of the IPPG agreement ahead of
the 1997 elections had been to establish an electoral commission that would represent
both the government and the opposition, in order to guarantee its independence and to
give it more credibility. However, the IPPG was only an agreement in principle and the
law was never amended to entrench its provisions. As a result, since the Constitution still
made the appointed of ECK commissioners an exclusive prerogative of the President and
there was no provision to seek legal redress if the letter and spirit of the agreement was
not respected, M. Kibaki was free to choose to honour or not to honour it. This is why the
manner  in  which ECK commissioners  were  appointed is  considered one of  the  main
explanations for its involvement in rigging.
 
The commission’s failure to guarantee free and fair elections
8 One of  the less  known functions of  the Electoral  Commission is  the creation of  new
constituencies. However, such responsibility is first and foremost one of the powers of
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Parliament, “all constituencies must be as equitable as possible in population, as far as deemed
practical by the Commission” (Article 42 of the Constitution). In 1963, 117 constituencies
were  instituted based on recommendations  of  the  Kenya  Constituencies  Delimitation
Commission chaired by S. Foster-Sutton. In 1966, 41 new ones were created before going
up to 188 in 1986 and then finally increasing to the current total of 210 before the 1997
elections16.  However,  at  least  12  of  the  last  constituencies  were  created  for  political
reasons—to increase KANU’s chances in Parliament, without considering the principle of
equal representation of all citizens and most notably, the ECK did not object.17 The law
states that the number of constituencies should be reviewed every 10 years in view of
population growth. That is why, in December 2007, the ECK proposed the creation of new
constituencies,  giving Parliament the justification that some constituencies that were
heavily  populated  (Embakasi,  Kasarani,  Lang’ata)18 had  the  same  number  of
representatives as others that were vast but were populated by less than 50,000 people, as
it is the case in the north-eastern parts of the country.19 S. Kivuitu therefore suggested
the  creation  60  new  constituencies.  However,  several  parliamentarians  objected  to
mandating the ECK to proceed, saying that the independence of the Commission was
doubtful and expressed fears that they would be created in pro-Kibaki areas to enable his
party to have more seats in parliament.20
9 Nevertheless, the most important role of the ECK is to organize elections. During the
elections  that  followed  the  first  multi-party  elections  in  1992  and  also  in  1997,  the
institution was heavily criticized for its inability to prevent double voter registration or
the transportation of voters across constituencies. In contrast, its work was praised in
2002. For example, in its report on the 2002 general elections, the European Union said
that “the ECK and its staff were well- equipped and in general appeared well formed”21. For the
first  time,  vote  counting  was  conducted  at  every  polling  station  rather  than  at  the
constituency level,  as  was the case before.22 This  new arrangement clearly made the
counting more transparent. Even though some cases of negligence were reported in the
voter  registration  process,  vote  counting  was  considered  well-organized  and  well
conducted.23 Following the 2002 elections, the International Commission of Jurists even
presented  S.  Kivuitu  with  the  jurist  of  the  year  award  for  his  accomplishment  in
promoting democracy. The award was also meant to serve as an incentive to encourage
him to continue with his role of guaranteeing fair and impartial elections. In the same
way  it  was  praised  for  overseeing  successful  transitional  elections,  the  ECK  was
congratulated for the manner in which it presided over the November 2005 constitutional
referendum. The two voting exercises also served as examples of speedy announcement
of  results  that  were  announced less  than 12  hours  after  the  polling  stations  closed.
Despite everything, the ECK still suffered from some limitations. During by-elections held
in Marsabit, Moyale and Nakuru in 2007, it could not prevent the corrupt practices and
the polls were not conducted in a satisfactory manner, according to the Commission’s
own admission.24 Thus, as the 2007 general elections approached, some questions lingered
over its ability to guarantee a well-conducted vote.
10 In the period leading up to the 2007, the Commission certainly played its role rather well.
As far as its responsibility to conduct voter registration and keeping of voter registers
was concerned, the ECK already had a total of 12.5 million voters in its roll by end of 2006,
and went on to organize several drives to register new voters up to October 2007. At the
end of this exercise, it announced a total of 14.5 million registered voters, with a record
number of new voters, particularly the youngest adults.25 Nevertheless, the enthusiasm
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with  which  Kenyans  registered  to  vote  should  not  conceal  the  fact  that  some
irregularities had been noted. For example, in the month of July, S. Kivuitu expressed
concern that the number of  voters in some districts was higher than the number of
identity card holders, which led to suspicions that there were cases of “importation” of
voters who had registered in certain areas whereas they lived elsewhere26. A few months
later, in October, S. Kivuitu announced that close to 400,000 voters had been registered
twice.27 Thus, the Commission Chairman was trying to ensure that it was more in charge
of the registration exercise and was safe from any political manipulation. However, these
revelations only served to create lingering doubts on the ability of the institution to
guarantee proper elections.
11 During campaigns,  the commission again tried to show its commitment by punishing
several parliamentary candidates for incitement to violence.28 Similarly, even with the
multitude of  political  parties  in the contest,29 it  successfully managed to print  ballot
papers (of course through a tender awarded to a company based in the United Kingdom)
and to dispatch election materials to polling stations in different parts of the country,
albeit with a few incidents.30 On the voting day, several centres, particularly in Nairobi,
Kisii and Narok opened late, but the ECK allowed voting to continue beyond the initially
scheduled closing time to allow citizens to exercise their right to vote. There was also a
mix-up of ballot papers involving various polling stations (ballot papers for Lenchami and
Ilpolosat in the Kajiado North constituency were found in Changamwe, Coast Province).
The  problem  was  resolved,  however,  by  airlifting  the  correct  ballot  papers,  which
occasioned just a slight delay in the opening of the affected polling stations. Finally, in
Lang’ata,  the  Nairobi  constituency  where  R.  Odinga  voted,  the  registers  with  names
starting with letters “A,” “O” or “R” were missing on voting day. Luo names mostly start
with an “A” or an “O.”31 But the ECK Chairman went to the affected area in person to
resolve the problem and R. Odinga as well as the other people affected by the unfortunate
event were able to fulfil their civic duty.
12 The ECK’s  image was  therefore  tarnished after  the  controversial  declaration that  M.
Kibaki had been re-elected. This was due to confusion that surrounded the announcement
and the cloud of doubt that hung over S. Kivuitu’s power over the Commission and its
members.  Indeed,  at  one moment  while  the results  were still  being awaited,  he had
intimated that he could not reach some commissioners by telephone nor did he even
know  where  several  of  them  were.32 On  30  December,  in  particular,  as  S.  Kivuitu
announced the presidential poll results for some constituencies late in the afternoon, the
results  were  contested by  W.  Ruto,  an ODM agent,  leading to  protests  at  the  Kenya
International Conference Centre (KICC) hall,  where announcements were being made.
Members of the police force entered the room and evacuated S. Kivuitu, who a few hours
later announced the re-election of M. Kibaki as president of Kenya in a room where only
journalists  of  the  national  broadcaster  KBC  had  been  allowed.  One  hour  later,  the
President was sworn at State House in by Chief Justice, Evan Gicheru. The ECK lost all
credibility and has been accused of supporting the Kibaki side by approving fraudulent
results. In this case it was even more criticized because there is a whole body of rules to
guarantee transparent counting and tallying of votes.
13 On the ground, a Commission officer is in charge of filling Form 16 (results certificate for
the presidential poll, indicating the total number of votes garnered by every candidate),
16A  (on  the  declared  results  of  the  parliamentary  poll  and  the  presidential  poll  by
constituency) and Form 17A (on the results of parliamentary and presidential polls by
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constituency), which by obligation must be signed by the officer and the various political
party agents. Furthermore, agents, the media and international observers can obtain and
keep copies of these documents, which are then sent to the ECK headquarters in Nairobi.
Upon reception, any candidate can ask the electoral commission for a re-count or a re-
tallying—a request that cannot be turned down. Therefore, when S. Kivuitu announced M.
Kibaki’s victory, even as ODM members requested for a recount in some constituencies,
he did not observe electoral law. The credibility of the ECK was further tarnished, after M.
Kibaki’s  contested re-election,  when four commissioners  (J.  Tumwa,  Daniel  Ndambiri,
Samuel  arap Ng’eny and Jeremiah Matagaro)  said they had serious doubts  about  the
tallying of votes.33 In conclusion, the ECK proved completely incapable of ensuring the
results of the presidential poll were authentic after three days had gone by following the
end of the voting exercise and the declaration of the new President. Doubts persist over
validity of the results announced by the commission. The accusing finger may have been
pointed at the ECK as the institution responsible of the chaos that followed M. Kibaki’s re-
election,34 but the crisis also highlighted the diminished credibility of the judiciary.
 
An independent judiciary in theory
14 After the swearing-in of  a president,  the law stipulates that decision to hold a fresh
election  can  only  emanate  from  a  High  Court  ruling.  Nevertheless,  R. Odinga,  who
contested the legitimacy of M. Kibaki’s election, refused to file any petition in court,
questioning the little of independence of the judicial system. From that point of view, S.
Kivuitu’s confession that: “I arrived later at State House to deliver the certificate and found the
Chief Justice there, ready to swear in Kibaki”35, (which implied that the Chief Justice ready
swear in M. Kibaki even before the official announcement of his re-election), also raises a
lot of questions on the autonomy of this arm of government36.
15 In legal and neutral principle, proceedings before the courts are also political insofar as
judges make their decisions within a specific political context. However, the judiciary in
Kenya has always faced accusations of  being close to the executive power and being
extremely corrupt.37 After the 2002 transition, one of the stated objectives of the Kibaki
government  had  been  to  put  an  end  to  the  judicial  system’s  bad  image,  which  it
considered as an obstacle to its efficiency. As testimony to his determination, M. Kibaki
begun by replacing Chief Justice Bernard Chunga, who was accused of abuse of office, by
Evan Gicheru. Furthermore, the Government appointed a Committee on Integrity and
Fight against Corruption within the Judiciary in Kenya. The commission was charged with
preparing a report  on the state of  corruption within the Judiciary.  According to the
document  prepared  by  the  commission,  known  as  the  Ringera  Report38,  corruption
affected 56% of  judges of  the Court of  Appeal,  50% of  High Court judges and 32% of
magistrates.39 It particularly questioned the integrity of five of nine appellate judges, 18
out of 36 High Court judges, 82 magistrates out of a total of 254 as well as 43 other civil
servants in judiciary. President Kibaki proceeded to name two tribunals whose mission
would be to inquire into these allegations. A number of people whose integrity had been
questioned chose to retire or resign, but a non negligible proportion decided to respond
and raised legal issues against these accusations. Among the cases that eventually came
before the two tribunals, only one was concluded with the acquittal of Justice Waki in late
2004.
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16 In spite of the “purge,” the independence of the judiciary from the executive appears
even more theoretical than real and, in spite of his stated will to change this state of
affairs, M. Kibaki has been suspected of partisan appointment of new judges. In 2003 and
2004, the President proceeded to appoint 28 new judges of the High Court in replacement
of the accused members of the bench. However, a number of issues have been raised over
the criteria of appointment, which are suspected to be more based on political, sectarian
and even tribal considerations rather than merit. These appointments have been cited by
some critics  as  proof  that  “the  judiciary  has  been  ethnicized.”  The critics  argue that  a
majority of the new judges are Kikuyu, M. Kibaki’s ethnic community.40 Furthermore,
rather than enhance independence of the judiciary, the anti-corruption operations and
the new appointments once again brought to light the control the executive wields over
the judiciary and gave currency to the impression that High Court judges are very often
“thanked” for favours to the system.41 This lack of independence proved to be blatant in
February 2007, after the annulment of the appointment of three High Court judges. In
theory, the recruitment and promotion of members of the bench is the responsibility of
the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), which makes recommendations to the President.42
But  after  these  judges  were  recruited,  influential  personalities  in  the  Kibaki
administration are said to have pressed for the annulment of their appointment, arguing
that the decision to appoint them was made without consultations within political and
government circles.43 This case showed that the Government was keen to throw its weight
on matters affecting the judiciary and the JSC, and thereby reopened the issue of judicial
independence. The separation of powers appears to be more than limited insofar as the
President exercises control over the judiciary through powers to appoint and dismiss the
Attorney-General and the Chief Justice. This explains why ODM has consistently stated its
reluctance to seek legal redress, arguing that the judiciary is in the hands of the PNU and
going as far as saying that M. Kibaki’s appointment of High Court and Appellate Court
judges shortly before the vote aimed to counter the possibility of a petition to contest the
results.
17 Besides, even though in electoral matters any voter, candidate or the General Attorney
can  file  a  petition  to  the  High  Court  to  contest the  result  of  a  vote,  the  delays  in
determining the petition are extremely long owing to the backlog in courts and also
because  the  set  period for  hearing and determining suits  is  unlimited.44 In  addition,
parliamentarians often take advantage of the shortcomings within the system to delay
rulings since legal loopholes allow them to obtain dismissal of cases against them. From a
more concrete point of view and as an example, after the general elections 2002, more
than 20 petitions were filed, five of which had not been determined by 2007 and one of
which only led to a ruling to hold a fresh election… that was held in May 2007 just as
campaigns for fresh general elections were picking up.45 In February 2003, Julius Daraka
Mbuzi filed a petition against the December 2002 election of Harrison Garama Kombe, MP
Magarini (in Coast Province), on the grounds that ballot papers used in the voting process
were at the time of the vote defective and that various cases of fraud had been committed
on the voting day.46 The High Court judge in Mombasa, J. Khaminwa, annulled the result
of the election then, but her ruling was followed by two appeals, one by Harrison Kombe
and the other by the ECK. In March 2006, the Court of Appeal in Nairobi dismissed the
appeals in two different rulings and a fresh election was held in May 2007 only seven
months to fresh general elections.47 The result was the re-election of H. Kombe.
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18 In the specific case of presidential polls, there are precedents that leave a lot to be desired
as far as efficiency in the courts is concerned. In 1992, Kenneth Matiba disputed D. arap
Moi’s election in the first multi-party election48 on grounds of fraudulent results, as well
as violence and intimidation by KANU. However, due to a flimsy technical “error”—the
petition was not signed by K. Matiba himself but by his wife, the case was dismissed.
Several parliamentary election results were also contested but most of the petitions were
never determined.49 In an irony of history, Mr. Kibaki also contested D. arap Moi’s re-
election in 1997.50 The High Court also dismissed this petition on technical grounds that
D. arap Moi had not been duly served with the court summons in person. Given such
precedents, it seemed understandable that R. Odinga rejected the court option, especially
because the ODM had won the majority in Parliament and President Kibaki found himself
in an unprecedented position. The election of M. Kibaki, who found himself up against a
majority  of  opposition MPs  in  parliament,  revealed  the  shortcomings  of  the  Kenyan
political model.
 
Discredited political model despite election of a new
parliament
19 The controversy surrounding the announcement of the presidential poll results obscured
the outcome of the parliamentary vote, which largely indicated the replacement of MPs
with new ones and a situation where the President did not have a favourable majority
behind him for the first time in Kenya. Out of a total of 210 elected, the ODM, led by R.
Odinga, won 99 seats whereas the PNU, led by M. Kibaki, only got 43 seats.51 Furthermore,
the parliamentary elections resulted in the fall of a big number of political veterans and
M. Kibaki allies, thereby demonstrating their aspirations for change.
20 Following the vote, only 80 MPs were re-elected. As a result, the 10th Parliament has 130
new faces of which women are a sizeable number.52 The 2007 parliamentary poll results
are  significant  in  two ways.  It  reflects  a  rejection of  Moi’s  old  guard  and the  older
generation53, and secondly, it reflects a “class struggle” which manifests itself in the wave
of change and the rejection of most of Kibaki’s former ministers. First, it is certain that
the 2007 elections was a litmus test for D. arap Moi’s influence following the failure of his
“Uhuru project” in 200254 and following the increased weakening of KANU, the party he
had dominated during his 24 years as Kenya’s head of state.55 During the entire campaign
period,  D.  arap Moi  tried to  influence  the  Rift  Valley  voters,  exhorting the  Kalenjin
community to vote for M. Kibaki. However, right from the start he had to contend with a
younger generation that had coalesced around William Ruto, who was intent on winning
to his side voters who had not forgiven M. Kibaki for sacking many members of their
community from plum government positions. Besides, the Kibaki government remained
very unpopular in the region because it had carried out evictions in Narok, Chepyuk and
Mt Elgon areas, in particular, rendering numerous families homeless. A combination of
these factors led to M. Kibaki’s defeat in the Rift Valley despite D. arap Moi’s support.56
With a number of former high-ranking Kalenjin civil servants who had worked under his
regime rebelling against Moi, the former President’s influence seemed be declining. The
election  results  in  the  Rift  Valley  are  thus  rather  paradoxical  because  several  ODM
candidates were influential  officials in the KANU government:  Henry Kosgey,  William
Ruto, Franklin Bett, Sally Kosgey (head of the Public Service under D. arap Moi), Kipkalya
Kones (former minister) and Zakayo Cheruiyot (former Permanent Secretary in D. arap
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Moi’s government). Furthermore, D. arap Moi’s stranglehold on the region was no longer
as firm as it was in the past.  This was demonstrated by the defeat of his three sons:
Gideon in Baringo Central, Jonathan in Eldama Ravine and Raymond in Rongai. Similarly,
all his allies in the province lost their seats beginning with controversial Nicholas Biwott.
57 The former president’s  popularity  is  today limited to  the  Rift  Valley  political  and
economic elite,  as well  as to the Tugen community, a Kalenjin subgroup to which he
belongs. In contrast, W. Ruto now appears to be the best placed to represent the region’s
leadership as he enjoys support from the youth and the poor as well as of the Nandi (to
which he belongs) and the Kipsigis sub-groups.
21 The  parliamentary  elections  were  also  a  testimony  of  the  will  to  punish  the  Kibaki
Government because 22 ministers lost their seats. All M. Kibaki could do was note the
defeat of his allies Simeon Nyachae, in the Kisii region, Raphael Tuju, in Nyanza Province,
Musikari  Kombo and Mukhisa Kituyi,  in Western Province,  Kipruto Kirwa, in the Rift
Valley, Morris Dzoro and Suleiman Shakombo in the Coast Province. Some of them were
even party leaders, like M. Kombo, Ford-Kenya chairman, S. Nyachae, Ford-People leader,
and R. Tuju, Narc-Kenya leader.58 Even in Central Province, the defeat of the “Mount
Kenya Mafia” (some of M. Kibaki’s allies), was a testimony of an anti-Government vote.59
Considered as “hardliners” because of their approach to national policies, particularly on
the issue of constitutional review, these close allies of M. Kibaki represented the most
radical wing of the Government and they paid for the failures of the regime, especially in
the fight against corruption. Many parliamentarians also paid the heavy price because
they had changed their political affiliation or because they had called for the “Yes” vote
in the constitutional referendum, when the draft constitution had been rejected in their
region. Moody Awori, outgoing vice-president, ostensibly lost his seat because he broke
ranks with the LDP, the party that sponsored him to Parliament, to support the draft
constitution, which was unpopular in his region.60 Furthermore, in Western Province, one
of whose constituencies he represented in Parliament, the elections marked a change of
leadership following the defeat of M. Kombo, M. Awori and M. Kituyi,61 and ushered in
new  “heavy  weights”  in  the  region,  Musalia  Mudavadi  (Sabatia)  and  Cyrus  Jirongo
(Lugari).62 This development was due to the fact that for the first time the region voted
almost unanimously for ODM as opposed to 2002 when even though it had supported
NARC,  KANU retained  a  number  of  seats.63 Therefore,  the  Kibaki  camp’s  strategy  of
promoting its candidate’s re-election by supporting Ford-K in Western64, KANU in the Rift
Valley and Ford-P in the Kisii region, failed to work.
22 Following these results and despite the overhaul of the political class, often in favour of
newcomers, there were lingering uncertainties on the loyalty of a number of newcomers
in ODM. These new faces could have been tempted to follow the example of political
opportunism set by ODM-K and K. Musyoka, vice-president in the new Cabinet unveiled
by M. Kibaki on 7 January 2008. Moreover, by-elections to fill vacancies occasioned by the
murder of two ODM MPs, the election of Emuhaya MP Kenneth Marende as Speaker of the
National  Assembly and the cancellation of  results  in three constituencies  could have
tilted the numerical balance in Parliament.65 Similarly, the leaning of members of the
smaller parties that had won 35 parliamentary seats combined66, could have changed the
equation of numerical strength in Parliament, especially since the legal framework for
the formation of coalitions and the change of political affiliation were not very strict. In
theory, in the event that MPs changed parties after their election to Parliament, their
seats would become vacant and by-elections would be held.67 For example, in 1966, when
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several MPs left KANU to join Oginga Odinga’s Kenya People’s Union (KPU), by-elections
were held in the affected constituencies. However, more recently, in order to deal with
divisions with NARC that had brought him to power, M. Kibaki had appointed members of
opposition to the Government of National Unity (GNU)68 and most MPs elected on the
NARC ticket in 2002 changed their political affiliation without their seats being declared
vacant.69 Though this manoeuvre caused uproar, there was no legal nor constitutional
provisions against it,  especially since Article 16 of the Constitution provides that the
President can appoint any Member of Parliament to the cabinet. However, faced with this
controversy, Parliament had passed the Political Parties Bill and an amendment to the
National Assembly and Presidential Election Act (Chapter 7 of the Laws of Kenya.)70 Thus,
Article 17 of the Act now provides that no parliamentarian elected on the ticket of a
particular party can accept to be appointed to the Cabinet without the written consent of
the  leader  of  his/her  party.  In  case  of  violation  of  this  provision,  the  affected
parliamentarian will be considered as having resigned from his/her party.71 In reality, the
sanction was minimal since under the Ninth Parliament,  the Speaker of  the National
Assembly, Francis ole Kaparo was quite flexible in his interpretation of the Constitution,
ruling that only a written resignation indicated a change of  party.  This is  why ODM
candidate K.  Marende’s election as Speaker of  the National  Assembly in January 2008
could mark an important departure in this matter. The PNU Government would have
needed a Speaker of such a conservative Parliament to interpret the law in its favour.72
That is the reason it would have wished to see Francis ole Kaparo re-elected. However,
not only will Parliament be presided over by a member of the opposition for the first time
in the history of Kenya, but the new Speaker said as soon as he took over the office that
his priorities would be to see a new Constitution enacted and to promote a more modern
and independent Parliament73. However, the majority the ODM commands in Parliament
was particularly instrumental in enabling it to make its weight felt even more in the
negotiations led by Kofi Annan, which, after a difficult start, ended with an agreement.
The  agreement  attempted  to  balance  executive  power,  which  had  hitherto  been
characterized by enormous presidential  powers,  through amendments to the original
Constitution adopted at independence.
23 In 1963,  Kenya indeed opted for a classic parliamentary system, based on the British
model,  with  a  Prime minister  and a  bicameral  Parliament.  The  Constitution did  not
provide for the position of President, and Jomo Kenyatta took the country’s reigns of
power as Premier Minister. However, in 1964, a constitutional amendment made Kenya a
republic and vested the executive power in a President, who was head of state as well as
head of government and commander-inchief of the armed forces. At the same time, the
Prime minister’s position was suppressed, to make way for the vice-president’s position.74
In 1967, the Senate was dissolved, ushering in a mono- cameral system, and in 1968, a
constitutional amendment introduced the election of the President by universal suffrage.
Gradually, the President’s powers extended to an extent that he appeared to have no
competing  centre  of  power75,  but  the  Kenyan  presidential  system  did  not  become
identical  to  American  model  in  which  the  legislative  and  the  executive  are  really
independent. Thus, “the originality of the Kenyan constitutional system is based on the fact that
the presidential institution is built outside a legal mould that is fundamentally parliamentary.”76
Besides, the Kenyan President enjoys a unique status: he/she represents the symbol of
national unity, above political parties, but because he/she also has to be an MP, he/she is
exposed to party game.77 Similarly, the legitimacy he/she enjoys because of having been
elected by universal suffrage, in theory, protects him/her from a censure motion. Indeed,
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Article 59  of  the Constitution  accords  Parliament  the  power  to  pass  a  vote  of  no
confidence in the Government by a simple majority. However, whereas the mechanism
plays a normal role in a parliamentary system, in the Kenyan model, where the President
is both head of state and head of government, the passing of such a motion would put into
question the independence the President enjoys by virtue of his/her election through
universal suffrage, and would amount to a “legal coup d’État.”78 Though this prospect has
never materialized, the ODM could have attempted this option to overthrow M. Kibaki
given its  numerical  superiority  in the new Parliament.  The signing of  an agreement
between the two protagonists ruled out this possibility and enabled the country to come
out of the crisis. The new arrangement, apart from providing for the reintroduction of
the Prime minister’s position, that would be occupied by R. Odinga, and the sharing of the
ministerial positions between PNU and ODM, it would also pave way for reforms, in the
least a minimal Constitutional review.
 
Conclusion
24 Even though the agreement signed between the two opposing parties brought hope after
the upsurge in violence that affected the country, there are still  uncertainties on the
future of Kenyan institutions. We do agree that the reintroduction of Prime Minister’s
position could limit the powers of the President in the current Constitution, but it will be
necessary to clearly and precisely define the duties and responsibilities of the premier.
Indeed, the agreement provides the Prime Minister with the “authority to coordinate and to
supervise  the  implementation  of  operations  and  business  of  the  Government  of  Kenya.”79
However, his future relationship with the President and the Vice-President are not very
clear,  while  his  place  in  the  executive  hierarchy  is  uncertain.  Similarly,  though the
reconciliation between the two parties seemed to be the only possible way out of the
crisis, Kenya today finds itself without a political party leading the official opposition in
Parliament,  which can also be a source of  concern over checks and balances against
excesses of the future Government. Finally, the consensus that the political class has now
reached on the need for national reconciliation and on the necessity to safeguard the
agreement through constitutional amendments must not make Kenyans forget that the
crisis also brought into focus a number of other problems related to the fundamental
issue of access to and distribution of national wealth, which the country should resolve or
risk a repeat of the same events in future elections.
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1. S.  Kivuitu announced the results of the presidential  poll  on 30 December 2007.  As
justification, he confessed giving in to pressure in order not to be considered a coward.
However, he would have been considered much more couragious had he weathered the
storm  and  waited  to  be  sure  of  the  results  before  announcing  the  winner  of  the
presidential poll. The Standard, 2 January 2008.
2. Article  42(a)  of  the  Constitution  stipulates  that  its  funtions,  which  include:  “ (a)
registration of voters and maintenance and updating of the voters’ roll; (b) manage and supervise
the presidential, parliamentary and civic elections; (c) promote free and fair elections; (d) promote
voter education throughout Kenya; and (e) any other function stipulated by the law.”
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3. The provisions of Paragraph 9 of Article 41 are: “In carrying out its duties under the
current Constitution, the Commission may not be subjected to instructions from any person or
authority.”
4. D. Throup and C. Hornsby (1998), p. 244–245.
5. Ibid., p. 247.
6. This was rejected by the High Court.
7. It  is  also in 1997 that the Constitution of  Kenya (Amendment)  Act  No.  9 extended the
powers of the ECK to make it better equipped to “guarantee free and fair elections” and to “
promote voter education throughout the country.”
8. Chesoni  did  not  hold  the  Chief  Justice  position  for  long  as  he  died  suddenly  in
September 1999. He was then replaced by Bernard Chunga. R. Chesoni was seen to be
fighting corruption when he set up a committee in 1998 led by Justice Richard Kwach to
prepare a report on the challenges facing the administration of justice. R. Chesoni himself
was,  however,  suspected of  abuse of  office,  having been accused of  receiving money
illegally to rule in favour of several businessmen involved in the Goldenberg corruption
scandal...
9. According  to  the  IPPG agreement, the  government  and  the  opposition  were  to
nominate an equal number of commissioners to ECK (10 apiece) to guarantee free and fair
elections.
10. They were John Habel Nyamu, William Mbaya and Kihara Muttu. Out of the other 10
commissioners nominated by the opposition, three came from Ford- Kenya, two from
Ford-Asili, one from the Kenya Social Congress and one from the Social Democratic Party.
11. The President appointed Abdi M. Ibrahim, Anne Mwikali Muasya, Felista Naetu Ole
Churie, Joseph Hamisi Dena, Joseph Kipruto Sitonik, Luciano Riunga Raiji, Mildred Apiyo
Owuor, Muturi Kigano and Samuel Arap Ng’eny new ECK commissioners.
12. He appointed a woman, Pamela Tutui, to replace Mukele.
13. The  new  commissioners  were  Samuel  Nyanchama  Maugo,  Shem  Sanya  Balongo,
Rachel Wanjala Kileta, David Alfred Njeru Ndambiri and Daniel Waisiko Wambura. Jack
Tumwa and Kihara Muttu had their terms renewed, with the latter becoming the new ECK
Vice-Chairman.
14. S. Kivuitu and G. Mukele were nominated to the ECK in 1992. Their term in office as
commissioners were renewed in 1997 and S.  Kivuitu was then made the Commission
Chairman. The term in office was renewed by D. arap Moi before the 2002 elections.
15. K. Muttu, who comes from Nyeri, M. Kibaki’s home district, had been nominated by
DP under the IPPG agreement.
16. F.A. Aywa and F. Grignon (2001).
17. Ibid., pp. 116–7. These were Mwingi South, Kaiti, Kuresoi, Eldama Ravine, Gwasi, Uriri,
Gatundu North, Mathioya, Khwisero, Sotik, Bura and Wajir North constituencies.
18. Embakasi,  for instance,  had 558,587 residents and 151,358 registered voters in the
2002 general elections while Lang’ata had 280,238 residents and 111,829 registered voters.
19. Turkana North constituency, which is one of the largest geographically,  had only
33,000 registered voters in 2002. According to S. Kivuitu, it was to be split as its area made
the work of a single parliamentarian difficult.
20. The Standard, 29 May 2007.
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21. Kenya General Elections, 27 December 2002. European Union Electoral Observation
Mission, Final Report, p. 5.
22. The tallying then followed at the polling centre of every constituency.
23. Kenya General Elections, 27 December 2002. European Union Electoral Observation
Mission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 33.
24. Electoral Commission of Kenya’s (ECK) National Conference on General Elections 2007
on 13–15th March 2007 at Kenya School of Monetary Studies, Nairobi, p. 4.
25. Daily Nation, 25 October 2007.
26. Daily Nation, 5 July 2007.
27. Daily Nation, 5 July 2007.
28. Sunday Nation,  23/12/2007. Aspirants Bonny Khalwale (Ikolomani MP) and Nderitu
Gachagua  (Mathira,  in  Central  Province)  were  fined  after  two  people  were  killed  in
election campaign violence in their constituencies.
29. A total of 118 parties took part in the general elections in which nine candidates ran
for president, 2548 aspirants for parlementary seats and 15,332 others sought to capture
civic seats.
30. Two weeks to the elections,  S. Kivuitu confirmed errors  in the printing of  ballot
papers, with names of some candidates or the symbols of various political parties having
been misprinted for 11 constituencies.
31. Daily Nation, 28 December 2007.
32. Daily Nation, 11 January 2008.
33. The Standard, 1 January 2008.
34. Saturday Nation, 5 January 2008.
35. The Standard, 2 January 2008.
36. Evan Gicheru indeed gave the impression that he lacked impartiality, particularly by
rushing to swear in M. Kibaki the same evening that the results were announced and
before an audience limited to the pro-government circle.
37. On  the  organization  of  the  judiciary:  Y.P. Ghai,  J.P.W.B. McAuslan  (1970).  On
corruption  within  the  judicial  administration,  refer  to  various  reports  by  the
International Commission of Jurists, in particular: B. Sihanya and P. Kichana (2004).
38. The committee was led by High Court judge, Aaron Ringera.
39. Report of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee of the Judiciary of Kenya, Vol. I (The
Ringera Report), September 2003, p. 30–31.
40. The first wave of appointments in 2003 brought on board 16 High Court judges from
the Kikuyu ethnic group, from the Mount Kenya region, whereas before the “clean-up” of
the judicial administration, the High Court only had three judges from this community.
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Kenya: Judicial Independence, Corruption and
Reform, Geneva, 2005, p. 2–30.
41. Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights (1992).
42. Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution spell out the status and powers of the JSC. It has
five  members,  who  include  the  Chief  Justice  and  the  Attorney  General,  and  it  is
responsable for appointing and maintain discipline among members of the judiciary. In
reality, it proposes names to the President who then appoints the judges.
Institutional Shortfalls and a Political Crisis
Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 38 | 2008
14
43. The matter led to a very strange situation in that following their appointment, the
judges were photographed in their official attire leaving the High Court in the company
of the Chief Justice. Then they went to State House, where they were to be sworn in by the
President, but they waited for over two hours only for the ceremony to be eventually
cancelled. Daily Nation, 9 February 2007.
44. According  to  Article  19  of  the  National  Assembly  and  Presidential  Elections  Act
(Chapter 7 of the Laws of Kenya), for all elections, petitions should be filed within 28 days
after the publication of the resultats in the Kenya Gazette and will be determined by an
election bench of 3 judges. The bench’s decision can be contested in the Court of Appeal.
45. Following of the December 2002 general elections, 25 petitions were filed. 12 of these
were dismissed while 10 were never determined.
46. Election Petition No. 1 of 2003, High Court in Mombasa.
47. During the 27 December 2007, H. Kombe lost his seat to ODM candidate Amason Kingi.
48. The result of the 1992 presidential election was contested through six petitions filed
in the High Court. Two of these were filed by K. Matiba, one by Gibotu Imanyara (FORD-K),
one by James Orengo (FORD-K), one by two voters represented by a lawyer and one by
John Harun Mwau. All were dismissed on technical grounds.
49. Refer to: D. Throup and C. Hornsby, op. cit., pp. 556–560.
50. In 1997, M. Kibaki came second after garnering 31% of the vote. On 22 January 1998,
he filed a petition in the High Court (Election Petition No. 1 of 1998) to contest the validity of
the D. arap Moi’s reelection as president.
51. In reality, when the seats won by the parties allied to the two grand coalitions were
added up, ODM had 102 seats (2 NARC MPs and one UDM MP) and PNU had 75 (the 14
seats won by KANU and those won by the various other parties), and also had the support
of the 16 ODM-K MPs.
52. 15 women were elected as opposed to only eight in 2002.
53. Some among the “veterans” were, however, reelected: John Michuki (75), William ole
Ntimama (76) and M. Kibaki himself (76).
54. In 2002, D. arap Moi unilaterally hand-picked Uhuru Kenyatta as KANU’s candidate in
the presidential election.
55. On KANU’s decline: D. Anderson, (2003).
56. Sunday Nation, 30/12/07; Sunday Standard, 30/12/07. The Rift Valley voted in favour of
R. Odinga, who garnered 64.6% of the vote to beat Mwai Kibaki who garnered 33.5%.
Similarly, ODM won 31 out of the region’s 49 parliamentary seats
57. N. Biwott was leading figure in the KANU government and Keiyo South MP since 1979.
The self-styled “Total Man” was one of the most feared politicians in the Moi regime. He
was sacked as minister and arrested under D. arap Moi’s orders after he was identified as
the key suspect in the assasssination of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko in 1990, until the
murder charges were finally withdrawn. His name has also been mentioned in most the
scandals of D. arap Moi’s 24-years regime, particularly the 1992 and 1997 ethnic clashes,
though none of these allegations were ever proven. His name was also mentioned in the
Goldenberg financial scandal.
58. Paul Muite, Safina party leader, also failed to secure reelection.
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59. This  group  included  several  political  figures  from  Central  Province  like  Njenga
Karume, Chris Murungaru, Martha Karua, Njeru Ndigwa, David Mwiraria, John Michuki,
Amos Kimunya.  A number of them lost their parliamentary seats,  namely N.  Karume
(Kiambaa), N. Ndigwa (Manyatta), D. Mwiraria (North Imenti), while others managed to
retain theirs: J. Michuki (Kangema), M. Karua (Gichugu), K. Murungi (South Imenti).
60. Nevertheless, M. Awori was an old man. Born in 1927, he was 80 years old when the
elections were held.
61. The same thing happened in the Kisii region where S. Nyachae, who had been in
Parliament since 1992 and was the apparent local power broker, was defeated by a Narc
candidate.
62. M. Mudavadi was elected on an ODM ticket while C. Jirongo won on a Kenya African
Democratic Union ticket.
63. In the parliamentary elections, ODM won 18 out of the region’s 24 seats while in the
presidential poll R. Odinga won with 65.9% of the vote against M. Kibaki’s 32.2%.
64. Ford-K, which had 24 MPs in the 9th Parliament, only managed to retain eight in 2007.
65. On the night of 28 January 2008, ODM MP for Embakasi, Mellitus Mugabe Were was
murdered, as well as another ODM MP, David Kimutai Too (Ainamoi constituency), a few
days later on 31 January. At the same time, the seat retained by K. Marende on an ODM
ticket fell vacant in accordance with the law, which states that the seat of an MP elected
to become Speaker of the National Assembly becomes vacant. The loss of these three seats
was significant as K. Marende had been elected Speaker with a difference of only four
votes (105 compared to 101 garnered by Francis ole Kaparo, the PNU candidate).  The
three  seats  fell  vacant  after  the  annulment  of  results  of  Kilgoris,  Wajir  North  and
Kamukunji elections, the PNU camp could again have a majority if it managed to win back
the six seats.
66. Most  MPs  from  the  “fringe”  parties—Kaddu,  Pick,  Chama  Cha  Uzalendo  (CCU),
People’s Party Kenya of (PPK), Ford-Asili, National Labour Party, Sisi Kwa Sisi, Democratic
Party of Kenya—supported one of the two candidates in the December election but they
always considered themselves independent. On the other hand, the DP, Kenda, Ford-K,
New Ford-K, Ford-P had conducted campaigns in support of Kibaki but the prospect of
nominating their own candidates for the parliamentary and local elections had caused
friction with PNU.
67. Article 40 of the Constitution states that any MP who defects from the party that
sponsored him/her to Parliament shall automatically loss his/her seat.
68. In his election,  M. Kibaki was sponsored by NARC, a coalition of several  political
parties, which included the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by R. Odinga. However,
within the first three years of NARC government, tension developed between LDP and
other members of the alliance. In 2005, during the constitutional referendum, the LDP
broke ranks with the Government and called for the rejection of the draft Constitution.
After the rejection of the draft Constitution, M. Kibaki sacked his entire cabinet except
Vice-President M. Awori and Attorney General A. Wako, then reshuffled it two weeks
later.  He  retained the  same  ministers  except  seven  of  them  drawn  from  the  ODM,
including  R.  Odinga  and  K.  Musyoka,  who  were  replaced  by  pro-government  MPs
affiliated to NARC (notably Charity Ngilu and M. Kombo), as well as some KANU and Ford-
People MPs.
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69. About three quarters of the 222 MPs of the ninth Parliament changed their political
affiliation between 2002 and the end of 2006, Sunday Nation, 3 December 2006.
70. After M. Kibaki appointed KANU members to join his Governement, one of the party
members, Justin Muturi sought to counter this move by introducing an amendment to the
National  Assembly  and  Presidential  Elections  Act,  in  order  to  stop  any  further
appointments of opposition MPs to join the Governement without the written approval of
his/her party.
71. Paragraph 5 of Article 17 of the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act
stipulates that: “No elected or nominated member of the National Assembly through or as a
supporter of a political party (other than the party whose candidate has been elected President)
shall be appointed a minister of the Government of Kenya in accordance with Article 16 of the
Constitution without the consent of the party that sponsored him/her for election or nominated
him/her to the National Assembly.”
72. The role of  the Speaker of  the National  Assembly is  fundamental  as he/she who
decides which laws, issues and motions to be prioritized. He can also control the number
of ex-officio members of the chamber.
73. In the third round of the vote, he obtained 105 votes against 101 obtained by F. ole
Kaparo,  outgoing  Speaker  of  the National  Assembly.  Farah  Maalim,  also  an  ODM
candidate, was elected deputy Speaker.
74. The  Vice-President  has  no  real  political  responsibility,  except  in  the  event  of  a
vacancy in the Presidency when he/she can become acting president.
75. For example, Article 23 of the Constitution provides that all executive authority is
vested in the President.
76. D. Bourmaud (1988), p. 112.
77. To be elected President, a candidate should not only will the presidential election, but
should also be elected MP in his constituency.  However,  he remains an MP after his
election  as  president,  as  opposed  to  the  Speaker  of  the  National  Assembly,  whose
parliamentary seat falls vacant after his election to head the August House. During the
2007 general elections, M. Kibaki was sure of winning his seat in Othaya constituency in
the heart of Kikuyu land but the situation was less sure for R. Odinga, parliamentary
candidate for Lang’ata, a constituency in Nairobi whose population was less homogenous.
78. D. Bourmaud, op. cit., pp. 118–119.
79. The Standard, 28 February 2008.
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